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Abstract: This study aims to analyse the effect of the association between revenue 
with operating expense, leverage, and firm size on earnings management in 
manufacturing companies in Indonesia. This study uses data for 2018 and 2017 but 
for some time series data needed to use data starting in 2014. This study uses market 
data obtained from financial statements using a sample of 74 companies that meet 
the sample selection requirements. The data analysis technique used in this research 
is Multiple Regression analysis with processing using the Statistical Product and 
Service Solutions (SPSS) program. The results of the simultaneous study cannot 
show a significant effect of the association between revenue with operating 
expense, leverage, and firm size on earnings management. The partial test shows 
that only the leverage variable has an effect on earnings management. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The development of company management at this time increasingly 
separates the owners from the management who run the company. This is especially 
true for public companies where the company is widely owned by parties outside 
management. The composition of ownership can also occur continuously due to the 
sale and purchase of shares between investors which can lead to changes in the 
controlling of the company. In the process of making investment decisions in the 
form of buying and selling shares, information is needed so that decisions made can 
be more effective in accordance with the investment objectives of each individual 
who does so. 
One of the main sources of information is financial statements. In an ideal 
situation, a good financial report will help investors in making optimal investment 
decisions. However, as explained by agency theory, differences in interests 
accompanied by asymmetry of information between the owner and prospective 
owner and the management of the company make management have the discretion 
to prepare financial statements that benefit the interests of management. Major 
accounting scandals have taken place in the world such as telecommunications 
company world.com, energy company Enron, electronics company from Japan 
called Olympus, and many other accounting scandals. These events are consistent 
with the results of the PKF Liitlejhon LLP survey (2015) which estimated the total 
cost of financial reporting errors globally of more than $14 trillion dollars. 
This has encouraged accounting researchers to conduct research to detect 
and address management actions that intervene in the preparation of financial 
statements for the purpose of these managers. The most common approach is to 
detect managerial decisions that make use of the discretion they have in preparing 
financial statements by trying to parse inconsistencies of data from the financial 
statements themselves [(Beasley, 1996) (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995)]. This 
has a disadvantage because, as explained by agency theory, in addition to managers 
having an incentive to manipulate their financial ratios, they also benefit from 
information asymmetry (Palepu, K. and Healy, 2003). Based on these weaknesses, 
various studies have used an alternative approach that is to use Non-Financial 
Measure (NFM) data such as the number of employees (Brazel, Jones, & 
Zimbelman, 2009), management behavior (Hobson, Mayew, & Venkatachalam, 
2011). 
Research conducted by Allee, Good, & Spirit, (2016) which is used as a 
reference for this research, has developed another approach by using the company’s 
electricity consumption approach as a direct measure of company activity. This is 
based on the rationalization that electricity is the main component that cannot be 
separated in the process of producing goods in the manufacturing industry. 
Electricity consumption is believed to represent the company’s activities. 
Electricity consumption is also considered not easy to be manipulated by company 
managers so that it is free from the weaknesses of research that uses accrual-based 
variables. Electricity also cannot be accumulated, reserved, or other things that 
reduce the ability of the variable use of electricity as a measure of company activity 
in real time. 
However, the researchers’ initial plan to use the amount of electric power 
consumption of each company that became the study sample could not be carried 
out due to data limitations. Therefore an alternative approach is done by assuming 
that electricity is part of the operational costs so that the variable use of electricity 
costs can be replaced with operational costs. An increase in income should have a 
strong relationship with an increase in operating expenses. Changes in operating 
expenses that grow lower than the level of revenue growth reported by accounting 
indicate that the company’s performance is growing faster than its actual activity. 
This can indicate that the company does earnings management which aims to 
increase profits. This also happens vice versa if the growth of operating expenses 
is higher than revenue growth indicating that the company’s performance grows 
slower than its actual activities which can indicate the occurrence of earnings 
management activities aimed at lowering profits. 
The design of this study refers to the research presented above by including 
two other variables that are considered to determine earnings management. These 
variables are company leverage and firm size. Both of these variables are thought 
to have an effect on earnings management actions. The composition of the 
company’s debt will affect management behavior in conducting earnings 
management. This is done to produce favorable conditions related to relationships 
with all company stakeholders. On the other hand the size of the company will also 
determine the pattern of earnings management actions taken by managers. Large 
companies with very well-established systems are relatively difficult to manage 
earnings. This is different from small companies that are relatively easy to do 
earnings management. 
This study will take a sample of research from manufacturing companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2017 and 2018 financial 
statements. The selection of manufacturing companies is due to rational reasons 
that the relationship between operating costs and revenues in the manufacturing 
industry is very high. Based on the explanation above, the researcher is interested 
to see the relationship between electricity usage and earnings management with the 
title "Effect of Income Association with Operating Expenses, Leverage, and Firm 
Size on Earning management" 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Agency Theory and Information Asymmetry 
The researchers used agency theory to analyse the relationship between 
principals (company owners) and agents (management). The principal delegates the 
work of managing the company to the agent with the hope that the agent will make 
the best effort to achieve the owner's goals (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Agency theory is based on the relationship between principals who give 
certain tasks to agents accompanied by the authority to decide on various things, 
especially those that are operational. In this relationship, there is a conflict of 
interest between management and the owner of the company. The focus of attention 
to agency theory is opportunistic behavior that may be carried out by management 
as a result of management's freedom that cannot be fully controlled by the principal. 
Daily, Dalton, & Cannella (2003) state that there are two reasons why 
agency theory is widely used to explain various management problems. First, the 
superiority of this theory lies in the simplification of problems that are actually very 
complex to relatively simple. Agency theory simplifies the company into two 
parties that can be clearly separated, namely managers and owners. Second, this 
theory uses a very general and rational assumption that each party is selfish so that 
it becomes a rational individual to fulfill his interests. Both of these reasons make 
Agency theory able to support a research that aims to explain various problems in 
the company. 
One factor that encourages management is able to produce personal benefits 
in the view of agency theory because managers have far better information than 
shareholders while shareholders cannot exercise direct supervision of managers. 
Kultys (2016) illustrates that in general reward in the form of salary and other forms 
received by managers will be an instrument to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders. The reward is expected to make management not take personal 
benefits and focus on increasing the value of the company in order to get high 
rewards and bonuses. This is one of the solutions because agency cost minimization 
solutions are not fully effective with the supervision mechanism because the 
interests of managers and shareholders vary widely between different times and 
conditions so that it will be difficult to conduct supervision. In other conditions, 
absolute supervision of managers will cause losses for shareholders because it will 
make managers unable to develop creativity in order to increase the firm value. 
Agency theory is built on seven basic assumptions; personal interests, 
conflicting goals, restrictions on rationality, information asymmetry, efficiency 
gains, risk aversion, and information as commodities (Eisenhardt, 1989). Two 
forms of agency theory have been developed, namely: principal-agent and positivist 
(Jensen, 1983). The initial approach to studying agency theory is the Principal-
Agent Theory which focuses on developing mathematical models. The research is 
based on econometrics and relies heavily on assumptions of self-interest, limitation 
of rationality and risk avoidance. The researchers who positivist character stressed 
the need for governance mechanisms, especially in large companies with scattered 
ownership on many parties. Furthermore, the positivist approach has been widely 
accepted since the 1980s and has expanded not only to analyse the relationship 
between principals or owners and the CEO as the company's top management but 
to analyse the relationships between various levels within the company. Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson (1997) note that to protect the interests of shareholders, 
minimize agency costs, and to ensure alignment of interests, agency theory 
recommends various governance mechanisms. This mechanism is generally 
emphasized by positivist researchers focusing on executive compensation and the 
structure of Corporate Governance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
Agency theory explains that the owner (the principal) delegates the work of 
company management to the management (agent) in the hope that the agent will 
make the best effort to achieve the company’s goals (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). As a result of the management of the company’s operations 
carried out by management that is separate from the owner, the management has 
more complete information than the owner of the company. This is very logical 
because the majority of company-related information comes from daily activities 
carried out by management so that management has the privilege of that 
information. Bhattacharya, Ecker, Olsson, & Schipper (2012) explain that there are 
two things that cause information risk. First, the risk arises from the uncertainty of 
information related to a particular matter that is desired by the company’s 
stakeholders. Second, related to the dissemination of information which means that 
management can make restrictions on the dissemination of information for certain 
stakeholders or groups of stakeholders. Based on this, it can be seen that for both 
the above causes, managers have the ability to intervene in both the quality and 
dissemination of information. 
 
2.2 Earning Management (EM) 
Performance measurement is one of the most important aspects in the 
success of company management. In terms of performance measurement, profit 
becomes the most important part that is often used as a basis for valuation. This 
perspective encourages profit to become an object loaded with various interests. 
Earnings informativeness is one of the requests of readers of financial statements 
in order to assess future earnings and risks associated with the company. The second 
role of accounting is related to company management. This arises along with the 
clear separation between company owners (shareholders) and management, 
especially for public companies. Agency theory explains that along with the 
separation of functions where management has a personal interest, the compatibility 
between the goals of the company and the objectives of the company owner cannot 
be guaranteed. The financial statements, especially the calculation of earnings, are 
one measure of how management carries out its function as an agent of the owner. 
The definition of Earning Management (EM) varies considerably depending 
on the perspective that underlies the expert who is trying to define that 
understanding. Some of these meanings are negative while others are positive. 
These understandings are complementary so it is quite difficult to make a complete 
definition and cover all aspects of EM. In general, the definition of EM can be 
divided into three groups, a definition that views EM as an act that is not good (a 
negative perspective), a definition that views EM as an action that aims to increase 
the value of the company (positive), and a neutral definition. 
Defining EM as a bad action was conveyed by many experts. Some of the 
definitions are quoted below. Schipper (1989) states that: “ ‘Earning Management’ 
I really mean ‘disclosure management’ in the sense of purposeful intervention in 
the external financial reporting process, with the intention of obtaining some private 
gain”. Schipper stressed intervention and the aim of personal gain. A more 
comprehensive definition is conveyed by Healy & Palepu, (1990) which states that 
earnings management practices occur when management uses justification in 
preparing financial statements to produce misconceptions to corporate stakeholders 
about company performance. This definition emphasizes several important aspects 
of earnings management such as certain decisions of management, changing 
transactions, changing financial statements, and misleading stakeholders. While 
Miller (2002) defines earnings management actions is the practice of achieving a 
desired number by utilizing various procedures to obtain it regardless of various 
things. 
Based on the presentation of the opinions of the experts above in a negative 
perspective on EM, it can be said that EM is an act that uses various mechanisms 
aimed at making the readers of financial statements wrong in interpreting the 
financial statements for the benefit of management. This will reduce the 
transparency and informativeness of financial statements. In this sense EM is an 
action that must not be done and will be a loss or expense for investors. 
 
2.3 Prior Research 
Research by Allee et al. (2016) became the main reference for this study. 
The research was conducted in Korea by analysing samples from 2006 to 2014. 
This study concluded that the higher the difference between revenue growth and 
growth in electricity usage is in line with the earnings management practices of a 
company. This study also concluded that the higher income growth difference with 
the use of electricity was followed by financial recording errors. In line with this, 
the difference in the growth rate also increases the probability of the company 
obtaining an audit opinion beyond fair opinion without exception. 
The difference in growth between income and electricity usage indicates 
earnings management actions that have an impact on decreasing probability of 
obtaining Unqualified Opinion. This also indicates the occurrence of fraud in the 
preparation of financial statements in line with Terzi Research (2012) examining 
167 companies in Turkey showing that audit opinion is associated with the potential 
for fraud. Various other studies also show that differences in real activities with 
financial reporting indicate the occurrence of earnings management. Research of 
Abad, Cutillas-Gomariz, Sánchez-ballesta, & Yague (2016) conducted in the 
Spanish capital market with a sample of 468 company financial statements from 
2001 to 2008. This study concluded that there is a positive effect of earnings 
management on information asymmetry between management and investor. 
Vakilifard & Mortazavi’s research (2016) which examined 118 publicly 
traded companies in Iran found the conclusion that management tends to do Accrual 
Based Earning Management as the proportion of debt increases within the 
company. The same thing was concluded by Cudia & Dela Cruz (2018) who 
conducted research in Manila which concluded that there is a positive association 
between leverage and earnings management activities. 
However, in the view of several other researchers such as Zamri, Rahman, 
& Isa (2013) who examined 3,745 financial statements of companies registered in 
Malaysia in the period 2006 to 2011 showed that the level of leverage has a negative 
effect on earnings management. This means that increasing earnings management 
will reduce earnings management activities. This is encouraged because improved 
earnings management will increase supervision of the company by lenders. For the 
Indonesian context, Saftiana, Mukhtaruddin, Putri, & Ferina (2017) examined the 
stocks listed in LQ45 and concluded that leverage affects earnings management 
activities. The research was conducted in the span of 2010 to 2014. 
Related to the effect of firm size related to earnings management, research 
by Ali, Noor, Khurshid, & Mahmood (2015) conducted in Pakistan concluded that 
firm size has a significant effect on earnings management activities. This is also 
supported by Rahbar & Khodadady's (2015) research conducted in Iran which 
concluded that firm size affects earnings management. Saftiana et al., (2017) 
research conducted in Indonesia shows different results where firm size has no 
effect on earnings management. 
 
2.4 Hypothesis 
a. The Effect of Income Associations with Operating Expenses on Earnings 
Management 
Revenues with operating expenses should have the same growth trend. An 
increase in income can occur if an increase in production occurs. The increase in 
production rationally requires an increase in operating expenses in producing goods 
and services. In this case the use of electrical energy is seen as a variable that cannot 
be intervened by management so that it is a valid measure of real activity. Under 
normal circumstances changes in income should have the same pattern as changes 
in operating expenses. 
If the change in operating expenses does not have the same pattern as the 
change in income it can direct the allegation that this happens because management 
uses its authority to change various accrual bases for certain purposes. The use of 
this authority makes the amount of income reported in the financial statements not 
a true description of the company's real activities. Based on this understanding, it 
can be assumed that the higher association between changes in operating expenses 
and income has a negative effect on earnings management. This means that in the 
condition of a high association between company revenues with the use of 
electricity shows that management tends not to do earnings management. Based on 
this, the research hypothesis is: 
H1: The association of income with operating expenses has a negative effect on 
earning management 
 
b. The Effect of Leverage on Earnings Management 
One of the motivations for managing earnings is to fulfill debt agreements 
contained in debt contracts. The debt contract is carried out by management on 
behalf of the company. In the contract there are various things that govern and are 
related to various indicators within the company. Basically it actually aims to 
minimize the risks borne by creditors. These indicators become an agreement both 
written and implicit in the loan contract agreement, especially long-term debt. 
In order to achieve or meet the target indicators, management is motivated 
to conduct earnings management. Management will use its authority to intervene in 
various accrual estimates in order to achieve various indicators, especially income, 
in accordance with the agreement in the contract. Leverage, which is a proxy of the 
proportion of debt, is thought to have a positive effect on earnings management. 
Based on this, the research hypothesis is: 
H2: Leverage has a positive effect on earnings management. 
 
c. Effect of Firm Size on Earnings Management 
Based on the many parties that have to meet expectations, large companies 
have greater motivation to manage earnings. The management of large companies 
aims to meet the expectations of many investors or shareholders. This is 
increasingly a demand because in the movement of stock prices is largely 
determined by the signal given by the company through information disseminated 
to the public. Based on this it can be understood that the management of large 
companies will have greater motivation in managing earnings. 
On the other hand, the larger a company, the more estimates and 
assessments that become the exclusive authority of management. The existence of 
information asymmetry between the management that manages the company and 
other stakeholders makes management relatively free to utilize its discretion to 
produce financial reports as they wish. Based on these two reasons, the hypotheses 
of this study are: 
H3: Firm size has a positive effect on earnings management. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
This type of research is a comparative causal study that aims to analyze the 
effect of the variable Association of Income with Operating Expenses (APdBO), 
Leverage (L) and Firm Size (UP) on Earnings Management (ML). Each of these 
variables is obtained by the following mechanism: 
Association of Operating Expenses (APdBO): This variable measures the 
association between changes in electricity usage and changes in income. 
 
Leverage (L): Leverage is a measure of the proportion of debt financing to 
company assets. The greater the value of leverage means the proportion of debt 
financing on assets is relatively large. The measurement that will be used in this 
research is Debt to Equity Ratio (DER). 
 Firm Size (UP): Firm size in this study is stated by total assets. To obtain a stable 
size and relatively normal distribution the size of the company is assessed by the 
log of total assets. Log of total Assets is used to reduce the significant difference 
between firm size that is too large and firm size that is too small. 
Size = Log Total Assets 
 
Earning Management (ML): Earning Management (ML) variable is measured by 
calculating the disretionary accrual through the Modified Jones Model approach. 
 
The type of data used is secondary data that has been published by the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) and the Capital Market Supervisory Agency for 
the period 2017 to 2018. For the measurement of the association between income 
and operating costs time series data is used starting in 2014. This study will use a 
regression approach multiple with the proposed regression model are as follows: 
 
MLit   : Earning Management of i company in t year  
APdBO  : Association of Income with Operating Expenses  
L   : Composition of Corporate Debt 
LnUP   : Natural logarithm of total assets 
 
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 RESULT 
Based on the descriptive statistic results it can be seen that the variation of 
the data distribution is quite large because the range of values between the minimum 
and maximum is large enough and the standard deviation is relatively large. This is 
not a common thing in research that uses capital market data. This highly varied 
data state results in the limitation of the analysis that can be performed on the 
average. On average each variable becomes less valid is used as a basis for analysis. 
For the Association of Operating Income and Expenses (APdBO) the range 
of minimum and maximum values is wide enough from starting a perfect negative 
correlation (-1) to a perfect positive correlation (+1). This is because there are left 
and right outlier values for some companies so analyzing the maximum and 
minimum values becomes less relevant to do. The average APdBO value of 0.452 
indicates that in general there is a positive association between operating expenses 
and revenues, which means changes in operating expenses move in line with 
changes in income. This value is relatively logical because the two things are 
supposed to move in line. However, the value of 0.452 is relatively small when 
compared to the natural characteristics of the relationship between the two 
variables. The relationship between changes in the value of opinion variables with 
changes in operational values should indicate a greater value. This indicates that 
the influence of the association on earnings management might not show a large 
effect. 
In the variable Leverage (L) a minimum value of 0.091 is obtained, which 
means the smallest proportion of debt use is 9.1% of the capital while the largest is 
955.1% or 9.5 x of total capital. This shows the level of variation in the company’s 
capital structure is quite diverse. This is also in line with the average value of 
leverage of 1,124 with a deviation of 1,363. This average value shows the use of 
debt that is quite large at 1.12 x of the average capital, but a large deviation shows 
wide variations between companies. The use of debt funding in a company will 
basically have a positive impact if managed properly. This is according to the 
meaning of “leverage” will be able to be a lever in increasing firm value. However, 
the use of a large proportion of debt if not managed with good debt management 
can increase company risk. It can also encourage management intentions to present 
financial statements that make external parties misjudge the level of risk associated 
with corporate debt. 
Earnings Management Variable (ML) shows relatively small minimum and 
maximum values between 0.002 and 0.870. This shows that the earning 
management action is relatively not proven to be in line with the average value of 
0.089. A standard deviation of 0.111 indicates a relatively moderate range. This 
shows that companies in Indonesia are relatively not very concerned with earnings 
management. 
This result is limited to the use of earnings management detection through 
a discrete accrual model proposed by Jones, known as the Modified Jones Model. 
However, it is possible, management to manage earnings through techniques that 
are not detected by the accrual discretionary model. Even if it is considered real 
earning management to occur in the Indonesian capital market, the value of earning 
management ranging from negative and positive values shows that the pattern of 
earning management objectives is quite varied between those aimed at raising 
profits with those aimed at reducing profits. Besides that the relatively small value 
of earnings management can make the influence of the variable under study on 
earnings management likely very small. 
Descriptive statistical analysis results show that the existence of earnings 
management in manufacturing companies selected as research samples is relatively 
low. If earnings management is relatively low, then mathematically testing the 
effect on it will be difficult to prove. This was further proven in the influence test 
where neither simultaneous nor partial effect was found. Of the three variables 
examined, namely the association of income with operating expenses, leverage, and 
company size, only the leverage variable gives effect. 
The model proposed in this study can indeed be said to be significant 
because the significance value of the model is 0.03 smaller than the 0.05 
significance level. However, the relatively small coefficient of determination shows 
that this model cannot build a model that explains earnings management. The level 
of earnings management that was successfully calculated using the accrual 
discretionary model with the modified Jones model may no longer be accurate in 
detecting management behavior in carrying out earnings management. The 
selection of this model in the study was encouraged that based on the data needed 
to do the calculation, the modified jones model was the best model with the 
available data. However, as the development of reporting standards, future research 
can use a more comprehensive model. 
In the initial stages of the study, the researcher was very confident that the 
variable income association with operating expenses had a significant influence on 
earnings management. However, after starting the tabulation of data and doing 
descriptive statistical calculations, the researchers found that the data patterns that 
relatively had a large deviation and the value of earnings management that were 
relatively close to zero would make the results of this study no significant effect. 
Although these results are generally in accordance with a variety of related earnings 
management, but these results are contrary to the results of research that is a 
reference of this research is the research conducted by Alle, Good, and Roh (2017). 
These results also lead to the conclusion that even if management carries out 
earnings management actions, then it is relatively done in a way that can no longer 
be detected with the discreationary accrual model approach. Various studies such 
as Vakilifard & Mortazavi (2016), Tejo & Sanjaya (2016), Hashemi & Rabiee 
(2011), etc. distinguish between accrual-based earnings management activities and 
real earnings management. 
Furthermore, in accordance with various previous studies that have been 
conducted related to the influence of debt levels with earnings management which 
are always relatively significant also proven in this study. Although the results of 
this study are different from the results of studies such as the results of the study 
(Zamri et al., (2013) and several other studies, but generally in accordance with the 
majority of the results of other studies (Vakilifard & Mortazavi (2016), Cudia & 
Dela Cruz (2018), Situmeang, Maksum, Erlina, & Supriana (2018) Specifically for 
the Indonesian context, this study is in line with the results of Saftiana et al. (2017) 
which concluded that there is an effect of debt on earnings management activities. 
Amid the relatively small condition of the results of the detection of earnings 
management, the variable of leverage remains proven to have a significant effect. 
This encourages understanding that the proportion of debt is indeed a condition that 
most encourages management to intervene in its financial statements. This is very 
understandable because management has the interest to send signals in the form of 
information to external parties both investors and potential investors that 
management can control risk properly. 
This is very crucial because if management is suspected of not being able to 
carry out risk management related to debt properly, it will have a direct impact on 
the movement of stock prices on the exchange. Management of companies with a 
large proportion of debt will seriously pay attention to financial statements, 
Management will endeavour to provide information that is to convince external 
parties that they can control risk properly. Based on this, investors and potential 
investors need to give more detailed attention to companies that have a greater 
proportion of debt because there is a higher intention for their managers to intervene 
in financial reporting. 
In the aspect of firm size there is no evidence of a relationship between firm 
size and earnings management actions. Although it is not in accordance with some 
previous studies such as Ali et al., (2015), Rahbar & Khodadady, (2015), etc. which 
concludes that there is no effect of firm size on earnings management, various 
studies indeed provide different conclusions. Various other studies, especially for 
the Indonesian index as conducted by Saftiana et al., (2017) conclude that firm size 
does not affect earnings management activities. Researchers believe that the 
unproven influence is also strongly related to the results of the detection of earnings 
management that is not too large so it is difficult to prove the effect of other 
variables on earnings management. Researchers still recommend that companies 
that have smaller sizes have the intention to do earnings management because of 
the lack of broad observations from investors. Users of financial statements are still 
recommended to pay more attention to the financial statements of smaller 
companies. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION 
5.1 Conclusion 
Based on the results of data analysis and the discussion carried out in the 
previous section, this study yielded several conclusions as follows: 
a. The Association of Income with Operating Expenses (APdBO), 
Leverage (L), and Firm Size (UP) simultaneously falls on Earning 
Management (ML). 
b. The Income Association with Operating Expenses (APdBO) has no 
effect on Earning Management. One reason is because based on 
descriptive statistical analysis, the company selected as a sample 
performs earnings management actions relatively small. Besides that, 
the possibility of detecting earnings management with the principle of 
discretionary accruals may not be able to detect management actions. 
c. Leverage affects the earnings management. This effect proved 
significant in the condition of earnings management actions undertaken 
by the company actually not too large so it shows the influence of the 
proportion of debt to earnings management is quite real. 
d. Firm size has not been proven to affect earnings management. This 
shows that the absence of a real pattern of differences in firm size will 
affect the difference in the pattern of management actions in carrying 
out earnings management. 
 
5.2 Limitation 
Researchers have tried to conduct research optimally but there are a number 
of obstacles that occur, namely: 
a. Detection of Earnings Management with the Modified Jones accrual 
discretionery model, although it is still the most commonly used 
measure, it is likely that it is no longer able to properly detect earnings 
management behavior. The researcher recommends looking for other 
measurement alternatives that fit the characteristics of companies 
registered in Indonesia. 
b. The amount of outlier / outlier data is large enough to result in data 
processing not being carried out at the maximum sample size level. 
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